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DETERRENCE OR DISGORGEMENT?
READING CIRAOLO AFTER CAMPBELL
ANTHONY

I.

J.

SEBOK*

DETERRENCE WITHOUT PUNISHMENT: THE IDEA OF SOCIALLY
COMPENSATORY DAMAGES

In Ciraolo v. City of New York,1 Judge Guido Calabresi had the opportunity to apply the teachings of Professor Guido Calabresi to the
problem of punitive damages. The case presented a single, relatively
simple question of statutory interpretation, which Judge Calabresi
converted into an extremely interesting discussion about the nature of
the function of deterrence in punitive damages.
The issue presented in Ciraolo was whether the City of New York
could be held liable for punitive damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 2
Debra Ciraolo was one of many people strip searched after being arrested by the New York City police and brought to the Manhattan Detention Center. 3 Because Ciraolo was only arrested for a
misdemeanor, the police had no right to strip search her unless they
had a reasonable suspicion that she was concealing a weapon or contraband. 4 In her suit, Ciraolo argued that the strip search was estalrlished police policy and that the city had adopted the policy in the
face of settled law of the Second Circuit. 5 At trial, the judge instructed the jury that punitive damages could be awarded against the
city if they found that the city had acted maliciously or wantonly in
adopting the policy. 6 The jury rejected a variety of Ciraolo's claims in
common-law tort (such as battery), but awarded her $19,645 in compensatory damages for the rights violation and $5,000,000 in punitive
damages. 7

* Centennial Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School. This Article greatly benefited
from comments offered by participants at the Calabresi Symposium at the University of
Maryland and a workshop at the Fordham University School of Law. I am especially grateful to Ben Zipursky, Catherine Sharkey, and Martin Stone for their criticisms and suggestions. Excellent research assistance was provided by Ryan Micallef, BLS '06. This Article
was written with the support of a Summer Research Grant from Brooklyn Law School.
1. 216 F.3d 236 (2d Cir. 2000) .
2. Id. at 237.
3. Id.
4. Id. at 238 (citing Weber v. Dell, 804 F.2d 796, 802 (2d Cir. 1986)).
5. Id. at 237-38.
6. Id. at 238.
7. Id.
541
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The city appealed the punitive damages award. It argued that
municipalities are ordinarily immune from punitive damages under
§ 1983. 8 Ciraolo answered that the Supreme Court had indicated that
punitive damages under § 1983 are permitted where it can be shown
that the municipality's taxpayers were "directly responsible" for the
abuse of the plaintiff's civil rights. 9 Judge Calabresi, writing for a
unanimous court, held that the policy adopted by the City of New
York did not fit into the narrow exception cited by Ciraolo. 10
Judge Calabresi then concurred with his own opinion, and argued that the Supreme Court's reasons for immunizing municipalities
from punitive damages in § 1983 actions were inconsistent with the
policies behind the statute and its own reasoning in Newport. 11 The
Court had held in Newport that one purpose of § 1983 is to deter
wrongdoing by government, and that punitive damages can, in theory,
promote that purpose, because one function of punitive damages in
common law is deterrence. 12 However, the Court concluded that due
to particular features of decisionmaking by municipalities, punitive
damages do not actually deter wrongdoing by the government any
more than the payment of actual damages. 13
I agree with Judge Calabresi's ultimate conclusion that the Supreme Court made a mistake in Newport, and that this mistake was the
result of a misunderstanding of the purposes of punitive damages and
how those purposes should be evaluated under federal law. 14 At the
end of this Article, I will return to the question of why punitive damages should be allowed under § 1983. For the moment, I am interested in Judge Calabresi's reasons.
Judge Calabresi argued that the Court misunderstood the relationship between punitive damages and deterrence. The Court admitted that punitive damages, if they in fact deterred municipalities,

8. Id. The city relied upon City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc. , 453 U.S. 247 (1981) .
Ciraolo, 216 F.3d at 238.
9. Ciraolo, 216 F.3d at 238 (quoting Newport, 453 U.S. at 267 n.29).
10. Id. at 240-42.
11. Id. at 242-50 (Calabresi,J., concurring) .
12. Newport, 453 U.S. at 268.
13. Id. at 268-70. The Court argued that (1) it was not obvious that municipal officials
would be deterred by payments borne by taxpayers; (2) even without punitive damages,
municipal officials who commit constitutional torts might be replaced by voters angered by
compensatory judgments; (3) punitive damages assessed against municipal officials in their
personal capacity would be more effective; and (4) punitive damages might result in grave
financial injury to cities. Id.
14. See Anthony J. Sebok, "What Did Punitive Damages Do? "Why M isunderstanding the H istory of Punitive Damages Matters Today, 78 Cm.-KENT L. REv. 163 (2003).
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would fit within § 1983's statutory goals. 15 The Court found that it is
highly unlikely that the threat of punitive damages would deter misconduct by municipalities, because officials inclined to do wrong are
unlikely to be affected by any backlash by voters. 16 The Court took
this view because it assumed that.voters would react to rights violations
by municipal officers in proportion to the moral wrongfulness of the
violation, not its cost to the municipality. Therefore, the deterrent
effect of a court award would not be increased by adding a penalty to
the compensatory damages that normally accompany a finding of liability.17 Judge Calabresi argued that the Court "neglected" at least
one additional way that a punitive damages a.w ard would be interpreted by voters. 18 He noted that they would not see it just as a measure of the wrongfulness of the injury suffered by the plaintiff, but also
as an unjustified municipal expense, for which the officials who incurred it should be held answerable, in the same way that they would
be held answerable had they run up a huge debt or squandered the
municipality's money on something expensive and wasteful. 19
The theory of deterrence cited by Judge Calabresi is well-known;
it says nothing more than that agents can be incentivized into adopting safe practices out of fear that they will be punished by their principal if their actions result in net losses to the principal. 20 As Judge
Calabresi noted, courts have sometimes cited this specific theory of
15. Newport, 453 U.S. at 268. The Court found that there was no evidence that the
framers of§ 1983 intended it to authorize punitive damages, and that when the law was
adopted by Congress in 1871 municipalities were generally shielded from liability for punitive damages in tort. Id. at 260.
16. Id. at 268-69. The Court also noted that it is unlikely that the officials would be
deterred by the threatened possibility that they would have to indemnify the municipality
for the damages it paid. Id. Given that these same officials were not, by definition, deterred by the threat of personal liability, this assumption seems fair.
17. Id. at 269-70. The Court suggested that the punitive damages awards would have
their effect (if at all) because they would cause "shame and humiliation" in the officials.
Id. at 269. In his concurrence in Ciraolo, Judge Calabresi noted that the Newport Court
thought that deterrence is "an incidental byproduct of punishment," where punishment is
a synonym for retribution. Ciraolo v. City of New York, 216 F.3d 236, 248 (2d Cir. 2000)
(Calabresi, J. , concurring) .
18. Ciraolo, 216 F.3d at 243 (Calabresi,J., concurring) .
19. As Judge Calabresi noted:
Assuming that a city is at least minimally rational in its decisionmaking, it will be
better able to assess the relative social costs and benefits of a particular municipal
policy if it knows that it will bear all, rather, than some, of the costs of that policy.... [W]hen taxpayers must pay more and get less in return they .. . make
their displeasure known.
Id. at 249 (Calabresi, J., concurring).
20. See, e.g. , A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Punitive Damages: An Economic Analysis, 111 HARv. L. REv. 869, 949-53 (1998).
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deterrence in explaining the function of punitive damages in cases
involving corporate malfeasance. 21 Why couldn't the Court see this?
The reason is that in Newport, adopting this version of deterrence
probably would not have made a difference. The Court may have reasonably believed that, from 'the ex post perspective, the compensatory
award alone probably would have been large enough to evoke
whatever reaction from the voters Judge Calabresi argued should result after municipal officers do something wrong. 22 The plaintiff, a
concert promoter, claimed that the City of Newport had interfered
with the performance of the band Blood, Sweat, and Tears because of ,
concerns that amounted to "content-based censorship," and that this
interference resulted in lower ticket sales for the concert. 23 The jury
awarded the plaintiff $72,910 in compensatory damages, which presumably represented the loss of ticket sales proven at trial. 24 It also
awarded $200,000 in punitive damages against the municipality, of
which seventy-five percent were attributed to the federal civil rights
violation and the remaining twenty-five percent as punishment arising
from pendant state law claims. 25 If it were true that voters, being rational actors, would be ready to punish the Mayor of Newport for having wasted the city's money, then the compensatory damages awarded
by the jury should have been enough to deter the mayor. Had he
thought about it, and been more careful with his exercise of power, he
would have realized that his actions would not have prevented the
concert and would have only created a deadweight loss of $72,910 for
the promoter in lost ticket sales, which the city would have to pay in
the end. The compensatory award represented the entire injury resulting from the mayor's wrongful act, and therefore the entire loss
for which the city would be responsible.

21. Ciraolo, 216 F.3d at 249 n.10 (Calabresi, J., concurring) (citing Fischer v. JohnsManville Corp., 512 A.2d 466,476 (NJ. 1986)).
22. Newpart, 453 U.S. at 269.
23. Id. at 252. The promoter and the city had agreed that a series of jazz concerts
would be presented during the summer in a city park. Id. at 249-50. When one of the jazz
acts had to cancel, the promoter sought to replace it with Blood, Sweat, and Tears. Id. at
250. The city objected to this substitution because Blood, Sweat, and Tears was a rock
band, not a jazz band. Id. The plaintiff at first tried to persuade the city that Blood, Sweat,
and Tears was a jazz band, and after having failed to convince the city of this, objected to
the city's wholesale discrimination against rock bands. Id. at 250-52. (The city may have
been wrong about the Fourteenth Amendment, but it seemed to have had the better of the
argument about what counts as jazz.)
24. Id. at 253.
25. Id. at 253 & n.6. The jury also awarded $75,000 in punitive damages against seven
city officials. Id. at 253.

2005)

DETERRENCE OR DISGORGEMENT?

545

Municipal managers, like corporate managers, would not need to
be threatened with extracompensatory damages if the taxpayers were
forced to pay every dollar of injury caused by their managers. But, in
the real world, not every wrongful act is redressed. There is often a
nontrivial possibility that a wrongful act that causes injury will not be
recognized as such by its victim, or that even if recognized as a wrong,
the victim will not want to bring a lawsuit, will not be able to bring a
lawsuit, will be barred from bringing a lawsuit (due to procedural constraints), or, for reasons having nothing to do with the true merits of
her claim, will lose the lawsuit. 26 All these reasons make the problem
of underdeterrence quite real.
Even in a case involving a single victim, sometimes compensatory
damages are insufficient to incentivize a manager towards acting in
the principal's best interest. Although the Supreme Court did not
think so, Newport is a good example of why this is so. Members of the
Newport City Council and the mayor apparently were afraid that a
rock band (as opposed to a jazz band) would attract a rowdy crowd
that would result in nontrivial expenses to the city. 27 It is reasonable
to presume that, rather than simply acting on personal animus against
rock music, they tried to prevent the concert because they hoped to
save the taxpayers of Newport some amount of money ($A). This savings, however, could only be obtained by violating the promoter's civil
rights, and they may have thought that the chances of the city being
successfully sued (p) were so low that it was worth risking a liability of
p x $72,910 (the compensatory damages) in exchange for a gain of
$A. 28 The Supreme Court apparently felt that this sort of case either
happened so rarely that it was not worth permitting punitive damages
to protect against its occurrence, or it thought that other factors (such
as the threat of punitive damages against the individual officers)
would ensure that the municipal officers would not be tempted to
maximize the welfare of voters by violating the rights of a few.

26. Robert D. Cooter, Punitive Damages for Deterrence: When and H(JW Much?, 40 Al.A. L.
REv. 1143, 1149 (1989).
27. Newport, 453 U.S. at 250.
28. If $A exceeded p x $72,910, then the city's agents would have been incentivized
into violating the Constitution. In such a case, the only way to ensure that the municipality
does not externalize the cost of the rights violation is to make it liable for l / p x A. Ciraolo
v. City of New York, 216 F.3d 236, 244 (2d Cir. 2000) (Calabresi, J., concurring) (citing
Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 20, at 889-90); see also WILLIAM M . LANDES & RICHARD A.
PosNJ;:R, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF ToRT LAw 160-63 (1987); Thomas C. Galligan Jr.,
Augmented Awards: The Efficient Evolution of Punitive Damages, 51 LA. L. REv. 3 (1990) [hereinafter Augmented Awards].
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Judge Calabresi argued that whether the Court was correct in its
judgment about the effect of awarding damages in the Newport case
was irrelevant in Ciraolo. He noted that "one aspect of the deterrence
function of punitive damages ... [is] that a wrongdoer bears all the
costs of its actions," and this aspect may not have been at stake in
Newport. 29 There the question of whether to add punitive damages
arose only after liability had been proven against the defendant and
the only victim had been fully compensated. If the purpose of adding
extracompensatory damages was to make sure that the voters of the
city understood the true or full cost of their mayor's reckless conduct,
then there was no point to adding any more damages on top of the
$72,910. The full extent of the harm created by the agent on behalf
of the principal was conveyed just by compensating the concert promoter (the only one who had suffered an injury). The difference between Newport and Ciraolo was that, although Debra Ciraolo, like the
concert promoter, was fully compensated for the injury caused by the
violation of her rights, the chances were -o verwhelming that, absent a
class action, the voters of New York would not pay for all the injuries
caused by the city's officers. 3 0
The lesson that Judge Calabresi drew from the Supreme Court's
treatment of the facts in Newport was that not all punitive damages
serve the same function. As he noted, the classic two functions served
by punitive damages are retribution and deterrence. 3 1 Judge Calabresi equated retribution with punishment, because in both cases the
ground of awarding the extra damages is that the defendant's actions
are blameworthy. 3 2 Usually there is an overlap between the punishment and deterrent functions of punitive awards, which is understand29. Ciraolo, 216 F.3d at 243 (Calabresi, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
30. Id. (Calabresi, J., concurring) . Judge Calabresi noted later in the opinion that
"records were kept that allowed the City to estimate that about 65,000 arrestees were subjected to the strip-search policy." Id. at 246 n.7 (Calabresi, J., concurring) .
31. Id. at 245 (Calabresi, J. , concurring) . This formulation is now standard. E.g., State
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 416 (2003). Historically, punitive
damages ranged across a spectrum of functions, including compensation, vindication, and
at least two types of punishment: punishment for purposes of exemplification and punishment in order to deter. Sebok, supra note 14, at 195-204. The contemporary literature on
the deterrent function of punitive damages is vast. See, e.g., Catherine M. Sharkey, Punitive
Damages as Societal Damages, 113 YALE L.J. 347, 363-70 (2003) (reviewing the various deterrence rationales for punitive damages) . The literature on the retributive functions of punitive damages is sparser. See, e.g., Marc Galanter & David Luban, Poetic Justice: Punitive
Damages And Legal Pluralism, 42 AM. U. L. REv. 1393, 1432-40 (1993) (discussing the retributive rationale of punitive damages).
32. Ciraolo, 216 F.3d at 245-46 & n .6 (Calabresi,J., concurring) (agreeing with Polinsky
and Shavell 's dichotomy between extracompensatory damages that deter and extracompensatory damages that punish).
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able, since sometimes both functions are achieved simultaneously. An
award designed primarily to punish an actor for a past act that is
wrong can also serve to deter others (or even that same defendant)
from repeating his act. But, asked Judge Calabresi, could there be a
punitive damages award that deterred but was not punishment?
In theory, the answer must be yes: The backward-looking function of retribution is logically independent of the forward-looking
function of deterrence. Judge Calabresi defined the goal of deterrence as the elimination of "activities whose social costs exceed their
social benefits." 33 When the fear of compensatory damages is enough
to eliminate activities whose social costs exceed their social benefits, as
in the classic application of the Hand Test in the Carroll Towing3 4 case,
then deterrence is achieved through damages that are neither extracompensatory nor retributive. 35 On the other hand, as noted
above, if an actor does not expect to be held responsible for the injuries caused by her socially inefficient activity, she might nevertheless
engage in it. In such a case, holding an actor liable for more than the
damages that were caused to the parties actually suing her might be
the only way to ensure that socially inefficient actions are deterred. In
such a case, extracompensatory damages would be required.36
Extracompensatoty damages might be determined in one of two
ways. The first method would require someone, ex ante, setting a
sanction such as a penalty. · If the designers of a damages scheme
wanted to protect against underdeterrence, they might choose to attach a penalty to a finding of liability, such that the actor would pay
compensation to the victims who did sue her, and a "kicker," either to
the plaintiffs who sued her or to a third party, such as the state. 37 In
fact, I take it that this is what Professor Calabresi had in mind when he
employed the idea of "penalties" in the context of "specific deterrence."38 These penalties would be the means by which society would
deter specific activities that it collectively deemed undesirable. The
penalties need not be fixed: treble damages, which are calculated after the injury caused by the wrongdoer has been ascertained, are a
33. Id. at 243 (Calabresi, J., concurring) (citing, among others, Gumo CALABRESI, THE
COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS (1970) [hereinafter THE COSTS OF
ACCIDENTS l).
34. United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 154 F.2d 164 (2d Cir. 1947).
35. Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 20, at 878-84; see also Dan B. Dobbs, Ending Punishment in Punitive Damages: Deterrence-Measured Remedies, 40 AL.A. L. REv. 831, 845 (1989).
36. Ciraof.o, 216 F.3d at 245 (Calabresi, J., concurring) (citing Kemezy v. Peters, 79 F.3d
33, 35 (7th Cir. 1996)).
37. J ULES L. COLEMAN, MARKETS, MORALS AND THE LAW 153-65 (1988).
38. See THE COSTS OF AccmENTS, supra note 33, at 110.
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form of penalty. Under this reasoning, the punitive damages recommended by Polinsky and Shavell are a type of penalty, too, since they
are based on a multiplier derived from circumstances known (or
knowable) to the actor before he acts. 39 Even traditional punitive
damages, which cannot be ascertained in advance of the wrongdoer's
action, are a form of penalty, albeit one that, bec;ause of the unpredictability of punitive damages, may not serve the goal of efficient deterrence very well.
All these methods are, loosely speaking, punishment. In each .
case, a quantum of damages that is determined independently of the
injury caused by the defendant is assessed against the defendant. The
defendant's liability for the additional quantum of damages (the penalty) is justified on the ground that the defendant acted wrongfullythat is, had the opportunity to assess the conditions under which the
penalty would be applied and went ahead with the act nevertheless. 40
One does not need to adopt any specific theory of punishment to say
that the diverse set of penalties described above are all forms of punishment. For example, punishment in the form of treble damages is
not retribution, if by retribution one means punishment grounded in
notions of desert. 41
The second method of calculating extracompensatory damages is
not as familiar as awarding a penalty, but, as Judge Calabresi pointed
out, can serve the goals of efficient deterrence like a well-designed
penalty. It would only apply in cases in which the defendant's wrong39. See supra note 28 and accompanying texL
40. As Judge Calabresi noted in Ciraol,o, the category of punishment usually is limited to
acts that are intentional. 216 F.3d at 245 (Calabresi,J., concurring) . Extracompensatory
damages resulting from acts that are not the result of culpable mental states-such as actions for which the defendant is held strictly liable-are not punishment. See id. at 245 n.5
(Calabresi, J. , concurring) (discussing strict liability and punitive damages) .
41. Usually retribution is associated with the idea of desert: that the quantum of punishment received by the wrongdoer is in direct proportion to wrongfulness of her act. See
Edward Rubin, just Say No to Retribution, 7 BuFF. CRJM. L. REv. 17, 28 (2003) . Rubin
explains:
Desert is the idea that the criminal should be punished because he did something
wrong, that he deserves punishment in the moral sense. It relies on the more
general principle that justice prevails when people get what they deserve, that is,
what the moral character of their action merits, whether good or bad.
Id. (footnote omitted) . But even this is ambiguous. Some people use the terms retribution
or desert to connote nothing more than the theory that defendants ought to pay extracompensatory damages when they satisfy one very weak condition: that they have acted wrongfully. See Richard C. Ausness, Retribution and Det.errence: The &/,e of Punitive Damages in
Products Liability Litigation, 74 Kv. LJ. I, 40 (1985) ("An important principle of retributive
justice is the notion of desert. The desert theory dictates that retributive measures be
imposed only when the actor has voluntarily and inexcusably committed a wrongful act."
(footnotes omitted)) .
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ful act causes injuries to multiple victims and only one of the injured
sues. A court could, ex post, estimate how many other victims the
actor actually harmed through the same act, and then multiply the
compensation awarded to the plaintiff in the courtroom by the estimated number of victims injured by the defendant's same wrongful
act. Judge Calabresi called damages calculated under this method "socially compensatory damages." 42 He noted that this type of extracompensatory damages award is not really a punishment at all, because it
subjects the defendant to a liability that is equal to the injury he
caused and no greater than what he would have owed had everyone
who could have sued him done so. 43 These damages would be "extra"
compensatory because the damages awarded would be greater than
the damages required to repair the plaintiff, but they would not be
punitive, because they would be calculated according to the actual injuries caused by the defendant's act. They do not impose on him a
cost greater than that which he has imposed on others. This second
method became the focus of Judge Calabresi's concurrence.
Before we examine why it was important for Judge Calabresi to
believe that socially compensatory damages are not really punitive
damages from a doctrinal perspective, we should note the ways in
which the penalties that are designed to deter differ from socially
compensatory damages that are also designed to deter. The severity
of penalties (which could range from physical punishment to mild
rebukes) will obviously vary according to the importance society attaches to the consequence of the socially inefficient act. However, the
amount of the penalty is independent of the harm caused by the actor. This is for two reasons. First, the penalty is set ex ante, at a time
when it may be estimated-but not known-whether the prohibited
act caused injuries to anyone but the plaintiff, and how severe those
42. Ciraolo, 216 F.3d at 245 (Calabresi, J., concurring); see Sharkey, supra note 31, at
389-91 (discussing damages that would be awarded to compensate the harms caused to
society as a whole, which she calls "compensatory societal damages") . Galligan's concept of
"augmented awards" straddles the categories of "penalty" and "socially compensatory damages," but a careful reading of his explanation of his theory suggests that he is committed
to the former. See Galligan, Augmented Awards, supra note 28, at 12-13, 62-64 (arguing in
favor of augmented awards added to other fines or penalties to ensure that the ex ante
threat to an actor capable of committing a tort is not "too low") . On the other hand,
Galligan does not want to draw too sharp a distinction between his theory of augmented
awards and socially compensatory damages; he views the latter as falling within the category
of augmented awards. Id. at 63; see also Thomas C. Galligan, Jr., Disaggregating More-ThanWhole Damages in Personal Injury Law: Deterrence and Punishment, 71 TENN. L. REv. 117, 128,
131 (2003) [hereinafter Deterrence and Punishment] (discussing Sharkey's theory of societal
damages and the goal of plaintiffs pursuing punitive damages to act as a "proxy" for those
who cannot sue) .
43. Ciraolo, 216 F.3d at 245-46 (Calabresi, J., concurring) .
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mJuries are. Second, as Calabresi noted in The Costs of Accidents, the
point of the penalties is to prevent the activity, "not to give individuals
a choice between accident costs and the costs of avoiding them. "44
The actual cost of the activity to society may be the primary reason for
using extracompensatory damages to deter it, but once the collective
decision has been taken to deter the activity, there is no reason why
penalties that exceed the social cost of the activity might not be appropriate, if it is concluded that such measures are needed to deter actors
ex ante.
Following this logic, Judge Calabresi noted that cases like Ciraolo
call for the category of extracompensatory damages to be broken into
two subcategories. On the one hand, there would be "punitive" damages, which would be awarded "where the defendant's conduct was
sufficiently reprehensible to deserve punishment apart from whatever
assessment was required to compensate the [plaintiff] or society as a
whole."45 These damages would be, in fact, penalties, although they
would take the specific form of open-ended punitive damages
awarded by a jury. On the other hand, there would be socially compensatory damages, which would be awarded regardless of the reprehensibility of the defendant's conduct, and would be required to
compensate society for its losses apart from whatever assessment was
required to compensate the plaintiff. 46
One of the great advantages of drawing the distinction between
punitive damages and socially compensatory damages is alluded to in
a footnote in the concurrence. Judge Calabresi noted that "one disadvantage of the current system, which conflates punitive and social deterrence goals, is that what are actually punitive damages rather than
socially compensatory damages can be awarded without adequate procedural safeguards and imposed on defendants who are not intentionally wrongful." 47 The problem to which Judge Calabresi referred in
2000 had been explored in a litany of cases before the United States
Supreme Court concerning the relationship between the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and punitive damages; the last
important case as of 2000 was BMW of Narth America, Inc. v. Gore. 48 In
that case, the Court had set out a three-part test designed to ensure
that no defendant would be held responsible for damages without

44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

THE CosTs OF AccmENTS, supra note 33, at 121.
Ciraclo, 216 F.3d at 246 (Calabresi, J., concurring) .
Id. ( Calabresi, J., concurring) .
Id. at 246 n.8 (Calabresi, J., concurring) .
517 U.S. 559 (1996).
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some form of notice. 49 The three-part test instructed courts reviewing
punitive damages awards resulting from trial to make sure that the
awards were reasonably related (I) to the reprehensibility of the defendant's conduct, (2) to the amount of compensatory damages
awarded, and (3) to the remedies or sanctions available under public
laws that would sanction the same conduct for which the defendant
was required to pay punitive damages. 50 The general concern that the
Court had was that, to the extent punitive damages resemble some
sort of quasi-criminal punishment, the kind of due process protections that come with criminal punishment should be imported into
the practice of awarding punitive damages. 51
Judge Calabresi, like many, was skeptical of the Gore test. His solution was to reclassify a large part of punitive damages practice-the
portion that represented an award of socially compensatory damages-as compensatory, thus dissolving the worry about due process
rooted in the idea that punitive damages are quasi-criminal. In this
Article I want to raise two questions about this solution and examine
them in the context of later decisions by the Court concerning the
relationship between the Due Process Clause and punitive damages.

II.

WHEN

ARE

SOCIALLY COMPENSATORY DAMAGES APPROPRIATE?

Judge Calabresi's argument for socially compensatory damages is
that extracompensatory damages are sometimes necessary to ensure
that actors make socially efficient decisions. As noted above, the calculation of socially compensatory damages is not like the calculation
of penalties described in The Costs of Accidents in the context of specific
deterrence. In fact, it would seem that the calculation of socially compensatory damages is no different from the calculation of primary accident costs described in Chapter Seven of The Costs of Accidents. 52
Treating socially compensatory damages as continuous with the
primary accident costs that normally would be treated under general
deterrence might seem odd for the following reason. The discussion
of socially compensatory damages in the Ciraolo case arose within the
context of a punitive damages award for an act that a jury deemed
malicious or wanton. One might argue that it is precisely such acts of
conscious wrongdoing that Professor Calabresi had deemed should
have been handled under specific deterrence. Although not stated
49. Id. at 574-75.
50. Id. at 575.
51. Id. at 568, 574.
52. The chapter is entitled, Which Activities Cause Which Accident Costs: The General Deterrence Approach. THE CosTs OF ACCIDENTS, supra note 33, at 135-73.
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explicitly in The Costs of Accidents, it would seem that intentional torts,
or torts infected by reckless or wanton conduct, would be the sort of
activity that would be best handled by penalties. 53
Judge Calabresi's argument, however, was that some socially inefficient actions might require two kinds of extracompensatory damages-socially compensatory damages and punishment through
penalties. Ciraolo might be such a case. His key point, however, as I
read him, is that the fact that the City of New York's choice to engage
in a socially inefficient action was infected by malice (and was not, for
example, the result of mere carelessness) should be irrelevant to
whether socially compensatory damages are awarded. 54 His argument
seems to be based on two very separate lines of argument.
First, as a matter of simple law and economics, it should not matter why an actor imposes a cost on another party if the actor is rational. That is, as set out in the theory of general deterrence in The
Costs of Accidents and repeated in Ciraolo, if the City of New York is a
rational actor, and it is capable of controlling its actions ex ante, it will
not take actions (such as injuring the civil rights of others) that will
cost it more than the value that accrues to the city from the actions.
Full compensation will deter the careless as well as conscious rights
violator, assuming that the cheapest cost avoider is the city (a not unreasonable assumption, given the easy availability of lawyers to the
city).
Second, Judge Calabresi suggested in Ciraolo that earlier courts
had already intuitively understood that sometimes punitive damages
should be awarded because they functioned as socially compensatory
damages. Judge Calabresi cited two cases, Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co. 55
and Fischer v. johns-Manville Corp., 56 to illustrate that punitive damages
53. See id. at 269-70 (arguing for noninsurable penalties for drunken drivers) .
54. Judge Calabresi argued that
socially compensatory damages might be permitted in cases in which all the costs
of a defendant's actions were not before the court, whether or not the defendant's conduct was particularly blameworthy. But a separate award of punitive
damages would be allowed only in cases where the defendant's conduct was sufficiently reprehensible to deserve punishment apart from whatever assessment was
required to compensate the individual victim or society as a whole.
Ciraolo v. City of New York, 216 F.3d 236, 246 (2d Cir. 2000) (Calabresi, J., concurring)
(footnote omitted) . This is why the Supreme Court's judgment that voters' anger about
the wrongfulness of their municipal officers' actions would not be intensified by the additional awarding of punitive damages ended the question of whether to award extracompensatory damages too soon: there still remained the separate question of whether the
voters would respond to the fact that the officers had, for whatever reason, wasted the
municipality's money.
55. 174 Cal. Rptr. 348 (Ct. App. 1981).
56. 512 A.2d 466 (NJ. 1986) .
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were already awarded "in situations in which the injurer, though liable, was not intentionally or wantonly wrongful." 57 His point, I take it,
is that by 2000 the common law recognized the more expansive social
compensatory purposes of punitive damages when it embraced punitive damages in cases where the defendant had not evinced the kind
of malice or recklessness seen in Ciraolo.
The question I would raise about the application of principles of
general deterrence to socially compensatory damages is that it looks
like an odd fit. I will start with Judge Calabresi's second argument
first, because it is a simple historical claim, and one that seems clearly
wrong. It is not the case that common-law courts award punitive damages "in situations where the injurer, though liable, was not intentionally or wantonly wrongful." To suggest otherwise is to simply
mischaracterize modern doctrine. 58 Furthermore, the examples offered by Calabresi in no way aid his argument. The juries in both the
Grimshaw and Fischer cases were instructed that they could award punitive damages if, in addition to finding that the plaintiff had satisfied
the test for strict products liability, they also found that the defendants
had acted wantonly or with malice. 59 It might be the case that the
socially compensatory damages rationale should apply to cases in
which there is underdeterrence but no conduct that would otherwise
qualify for retribution, but that is not the law today. The universe of
cases to which Judge Calabresi applied his argument were cases, like
Ciraolo, in which the defendant was a conscious (or consciously indifferent) actor who also happened to hurt more people than later
sued. 60
The conclusion that we can draw from the discussion above is
that the argument for socially compensatory damages in Ciraolo is almost wholly normative, not descriptive. If, following Judge Calabresi,
one insists on distinguishing between extracompensatory damages
that take the form of punishment and those that take the form of
socially compensatory damages, then except for class actions the law
57. CirMlo, 216 F.3d at 245 n.5 (Calabresi, J., concurring).
58. See, e.g., DAN B. Dosss, THE LAw OF TORTS§ 381, at 1062 (2000) (stating that punitive damages "are usually available only when the tortfeasor has committed quite serious
misconduct with a bad intent or bad state of mind such as malice") .
59. Grimshaw, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 385-87; Fischer, 512 A.2d at 481.
60. Professor Sharkey, who develops an argument similar to Judge Calabresi's argument, does not go as far as Judge Calabresi. She proposes a system of extracompensatory
damages that serve a similar deterrent function as that laid out by Judge Calabresi, but she
suggests that only defendants who have been found to have engaged in intentional or
reckless conduct could be held liable for socially compensatory damages. See Sharkey,
supra note 31, at 405.
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does not award socially compensatory damages. 61 There is nothing
especially peculiar about Judge Calabresi making a normative argument in Ciraolo; his argument seems to be a version of the argument
that he made as an academic. That is, regardless of what Grimshaw
actually says, Judge Calabresi can argue that what it should have said
was that manufacturers of products that are inefficient from the perspective of social welfare ought to be held liable for all the accident
costs associated with their products, not just the accident costs of the
parties actually in the suit. 62
The second question I want to raise is whether the model of socially compensatory damages fits the original model of general deterrence in The Costs of Accidents. In The Costs of Accidents, Calabresi spent
a great deal of time discussing the concept of causation as it applied to
general deterrence. 63 He pointed out that every accident had at least
two causes, the victim and the injurer. The appropriate response to
this fact formed part of the underlying structure of the insurance
scheme outlined in the book. The discussion of locating the cheapest
cost avoider in the context of reciprocal causation assumed that there
would be a variety of techniques to measure the risks created by poten tial actors and the injuries suffered by accident victims. 64 Under a
theory of general deterrence, these two questions are separate. The
incentive for a cost avoider to alter their conduct might be based on
"event-based" interactions, such as the famous "spongy bumper" example, where one party (the car manufacturer) is required to compensate another party (the pedestrian) under a rule that has been
selected because it causes manufacturers and pedestrians to make
choices that generate the most efficient allocation of resources. 65 The
incentive for a cost avoider to alter her conduct might be based on
61. Galligan has argued that there are many forms of extracompensatory damages in
contemporary private law in addition to punitive damages. Galligan, Deterrence and Punishment, supra note 42, at 119. Some that he lists are simply additional forms of civil punishment, such as multiple damages that are authorized by statute. Id. at 121. Some, like the
"collateral source rule" and disgorgement of profit in restitution, might be seen as cryptopunishment, although legal commentary does not often classify them this way. Id. at 120.
For an argument that disgorgment of profits in restitution is not a penalty at all, see Ernest
J. Weinrib, Punishment and Disgurgement as Contract Remedies, 78 CHI.-KENT. L. REv. 55
(2003) .
62. Ciraolo, 216 F.3d at 243 (Calabresi,J., concurring) . Calabresi recognized that this
would create a potentially disastrous windfall and "race to the courthouse" problems. As a
solution he suggests paying socially compensatory damages into a public fund instead of
directly to individual plaintiffs. Id. at 246-47 (Calabresi, J., concurring) .
63. See, e.g., THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS, supra note 33, at 6, 135-40, 299.
64. Calabresi discusses these themes in Chapters Seven and Nine. Id. at 135-73, 198235.
65. Id. at 136-38.
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"activity-based" interactions, such as in the example introduced by
Professor Calabresi where driving is considered a cost that the government charges to certain subcategories of citizens (such as drivers). 66
The chapters on general deterrence describe various permutations of
these two types of interactions.
Socially compensatory damages seem like an odd merger of these
two highly stylized ways of explaining how different kinds of rules can
incentivize behavior. In the spongy bumper example, the manufacturer did not pay for the number of accidents that it was hypothesized
to have caused. It paid for the actual injuries caused under the strict
liability rule. The manufacturer's total liability costs. were a sum of all
the injuries in which it had been established it was a cause. While it is
true that one can say that socially compensatory damages are nothing
more than a summing of all the interactions in which the manufacturer was a possib/,e cause of an injury to someone, this is not something
that Calabresi says in The Costs of Accidents.
The argument for strict liability as a means of achieving general
deterrence makes sense: it highlights the way in which the pursuit of
the cheapest cost avoider exploits the manufacturer's freedom to
choose whether and how to respond to actual costs associated with
actual choices made by the manufacturer. The moment one introduces expected costs caused by the manufacturer-that is, costs
not known to have occurred but estimated to have occurred-the
manufacturer's reasons for changing behavior have changed. The
manufacturer is responding to an incentive similar to that created by
insurance. If the argument for socially compensatory damages is that
the defendant ought to pay a certain amount because, according to
actuarial science, actions similar to those taken by the defendant
cause a certain quantum of damage to victims similar to the plaintiff
in the case, then the argument for charging the defendant with socially compensatory damages is similar to the argument for holding
manufacturers responsible for a certain tax or insurance premium because they have engaged in a certain activity.
However, socially compensatory damages are an odd kind of tax
or insurance premium. They are not calculated on the basis of ex
ante risk, but on the basis of an ex post extrapolation from how a
specific course of conduct affected a single plaintiff ( or a handful of
plaintiffs). Furthermore, they suffer from an extremely narrow form
of subcategorization. 6 7 Instead of falling into the risk pool of "all mu66. Id. at 145.
67. See id. at 145-47 (discussing the proper level of subcategorization) .
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nicipalities" (in the case of Ciraolo) or "all auto manufacturers" (in the
case of Grimshaw), the defendant is in . a risk pool of one-the actor
who has been found liable and who is known to have caused an estimated amount of social damage. One could imagine shifting the costs
of activity onto actors through insurance or tax-type mechanisms on a
case-by-case basis, but Professor Calabresi expressed in The Costs of Accidents a strong preference of category determinations over case-bycase determinations. 68
III.

SOCIALLY COMPENSATORY DAMAGES AND SPECIFIC DETERRENCE

It is time to revisit the question of whether the cases that Judge
Calabresi believed ought to be handled by socially compensatory damages are in fact best captured by a system of general deterrence. Perhaps Judge Calabresi, despite his statements to the contrary, should
have said that the acts that trigger socially compensatory damages are
distinguishable from those that are simply careless and inefficient because they are wrongful or culpable (and inefficient). 69 This would be
consistent with the idea, introduced above, that there is an overlap
between extracompensatory damages and specific deterrence.

68. Id. at 255-56. The problem I am discussing here is the inverse of the problem
raised by Polinsky and Shavell: whether to apply the punitive multiplier to the actual damages suffered by the plaintiff in a tort suit in order to produce the proper level of the
defendant's total damages, or whether to apply the punitive multiplier to the expected
injury the plaintiff could have suffered. See Polinsky & Shaven, supra note 20, at 915. As
Galligan notes, the particular plaintiff who brings a suit may not be a typical plaintiff, and
hence multiplying her actual damages by the inverse of the probability of detection might
produce over- or underdeterrence. Galligan, Deterrence and Punishment, supra note 42, at
133.
The problem I am raising has to do with whether the defendant's course of conduct
was typical of the class of actors to which it belonged. The liability rules that were designed
to promote general deterrence in The Costs of Accidents were based on generalizations about
entire classes of actors. If an actor is held strictly liable for an injury of which his act is a
cause, then ideally he should be held liable for an equal share of the total costs of all the
injuries that all the actors in his class create. In other words, he should be required to pay
into a fund that compensates victims of accidents produced by the class of actors, regardless of which actor caused them. Such a system would impose on all actors all the costs of
injuries that are estimated to have arisen from a specific course of conduct by a specific
actor. That system in tum would achieve general deterrence by threatening all the actors
with the possibility that the same course of conduct could result in strict liability of vastly
different sums, for no other reason than random chance.
69. This is Sharkey's position. See Sharkey, supra note 31 , at 405 (proposing the adoption of an ex post class action procedure in which societal damages would only be imposed
if the defendant's actions met a certain requirement of recklessness) . But see Galligan,
Deterrence and Punishment, supra note 42, at 142 n .128 (criticizing Sharkey for being inconsistent with the basic premises of her argument, because setting a required level of recklessness relates to notions of punishment, and not efficiency, deterrence, or compensation).
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Socially compensatory damages might be viewed as what Professor Calabresi called "postaccident penalizations.'' 7° Conduct that society wishes to restrict or limit is penalized by a sanction that is
announced after the conduct occurs, although there are general principles that put the actor on notice that a penalty could be assessed. 71
Under this approach, the penalty equals the estimate of all the damages caused by the wrongful act to anyone in society. Although the
penalty equals the total cost of the wrongful activity, it is not viewed as
a cost of the activity; the social damages are instead a device the tort
system uses to stop the defendant from doing an act collectively
deemed unacceptable. As Professor Calabresi pointed out, there are
other, more severe ways to penalize activities. 7 2
The one reason why Judge Calabresi might not have wanted to
classify socially compensatory damages as penalties is that he agreed
with the Court that, if an extracompensatory damages award is punishment, due process plays a much larger role than if the extracompensatory damages are classified as "mere" compensation. 73 Two
questions, therefore, must be answered. Are the costs imposed by specific deterrence always a form of punishment? And, even if they are,
why should they be subject to more searching due process constraints
than regular compensatory damages?
The penalties imposed by specific deterrence are not obviously
punishment in the sense that they are not obviously designed to be
retributive. For Professor Calabresi, even a punishment had to serve
some welfare-maximization function, and retribution-the idea that
wrongdoing is the point of punishment-had no place in Professor or
Judge Calabresi's world.74 Within the boundaries set out in The Costs
of Accidents, punishment can serve a welfare-maximizing function.
While Professor Calabresi mentioned very severe penalties in his discussion of specific deterrence, he clearly was much more often think-

70. THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS, supra note 33, at 124.
71. As Calabresi noted:
[S]ince the acts or activities are defined only in general terms before an accident
occurs, individuals will, in deciding what acts or ac tivities to engage in, estimate
what is likely to be penalized if an accident does occur, and the acts or activities
deterred will depend on this estimate.
Id. at 128.
72. Such measures include "jail, fines, the whip, the gallows, etc." Id. at 112. These
examples were obviously hyperbolic.
73. Ciraolo v. City of New York, 216 F.3d 236, 246 n.8 (2d Cir. 2000) (Calabresi, J.,
concurring).
74. As noted above, to say that wrongdoing is a condition for punishment is different
from saying that it is the point of punishment. See supra note 41.
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ing about taxes and fines. 75 The threat of these can certainly drive
actors, on the margin, to avoid prohibited activities.
The problem with analyzing specific deterrence through the lens
of punitive damages is that some types of costs that are imposed in
order to deter specific activities are clearly not punishment, while
some are. Taxes or surcharges on activities may be designed to drive
actors away from activities that have been collectively deemed inefficient, but they cannot be described as punishment. 76 Fines imposed
because an activity is prohibited do seem to be punishment, and certainly financial penalties associated with certain tort judgments might
be described as punishment.
It seems safe to assume, therefore, that a system of specific deterrence might at times employ mechanisms that clearly are punishment,
such as penalties designed to prevent certain activities, and not merely
to tax them. Clearly, the kind of financial penalties meted out in the
form of punitive damages look a lot like the sort of punishment used
to promote specific deterrence. Why not view socially compensatory
damages as part of the system of specific deterrence?
Judge Calabresi was conscious of the consequences of classifying
any kind of damages award as punishment or a penalty. He seemed
adamant in note eight of his Ciraolo concurrence 77 that socially compensatory damages, being compensatory, did not involve the court in
the same convoluted due process problems that had occupied courts
since Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Haslip. 78 Why should it make
such a difference whether an actor engaging in an inefficient act is
forced to pay the "cost" of that activity in the form of "damages," as
required by general deterrence, or in the form of a penalty, as required by specific deterrence? The quantum of various punishments
can be calculated within the framework of efficiency, as Judge Calabresi noted when he cited Gary Becker's work. 79
It may have been that Judge Calabresi was anticipating the
Court's decision in the following year in Cooper Industries, Inc. v.
Leatherman Tool Group, Inc.80 In Cooper, the Court had to determine
under what standard a federal appellate court should have reviewed a
75. See THE CosT s OF A CCIDENTS, supra note 33, a t 116.
76. When a consumer is permitted to buy an SUV but is asked to pay a tax, that is no t
punishment. If the consumer refuses to pay the tax, the sanctions that follow a determination of "tax avoidance" are punishment.
77. Ciraolo, 216 F.3d at 246 n.8 (Calabresi, J., concurring) .
78. 499 U.S. 1 (1991).
79. Ciraolo, 216 F.3d at 243 n .2, 246 n.8 (Calabresi, J., concurring) (citing Gary S.
Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76]. PoL. EcoN. 169 (1968)).
80. 532 U.S. 424 (2001).
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trial court's judgment concerning the constitutionality of the jury's
award of punitive damages. 81 According to the Court, "[a] jury's assessment of the extent of a plaintiff's injury is essentially a factual determination, whereas its imposition of punitive damages is an
expression of its moral condemnation." 82 The Court argued that, because punitive damages awards reflect moral judgments, they are like
criminal punishments set by legislatures. 83 Of course, in 1989 the
Court held in Browning-Ferris Industries of Vermont, Inc. v. Kelco Disposal,
Inc., 8 4 that punitive damages awards were not criminal penalties and
therefore could not be reviewed under the Eighth Amendment. 85
However, both punitive damage awards and criminal penalties share
something in common: the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. In the context of criminal law, the Eighth Amendment
is imposed against the states through the Fourteenth Amendment's
Due Process Clause, while in the context of tort law the Due Process
Clause is applied directly to the states. 86
The Court in Cooper also suggested that due process constrains
the states in criminal law and in tort law in related ways.8 7 In criminal
law, the states are prohibited from imposing excessive fines and cruel
and unusual punishment; in tort law, they are prohibited "from imposing 'grossly excessive' punishments on tortfeasors."88 A punitive
damages award is grossly excessive when it bears no reasonable relationship to the compensatory damages that underwrite it. 8 9 The
Court explained in Gore that penalties bearing no reasonable relationship to underlying compensatory damages violate due process, because they (by definition) cannot be anticipated in advance; hence,
these penalties violate the basic principle that no one should be punished without prior notice of the penalty. 9 0 The Cooper Court suggested that it had struck down punishments in criminal law because
they were "grossly disproportionate" in the same way that a tort penalty could be "grossly excessive."91 For example, in cases involving the

81 .
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.

Id. at 426.
Id. at 432.
Id. at 432-33.
492 U.S. 257 (1989) .
Id. at 260.
Cooper, 532 U.S. at 433-34.
Id.
Id. at 434 (quoting BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559,562 (1996)) .
Id. at 433-35.
Gore, 517 U.S. at 574-75.
Cooper, 532 U.S. at 433-34.
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death penalty, life imprisonment, or forfeiture, the Court had used
"the same general criteria" that it adopted in Gore. 92
Judge Calabresi may have been motivated by the same concern
that motivated the Court in Cooper, which was that decisions about
punishment are qualitatively different than decisions about compensation. The Court in Cooper, for example, argued that one reason why
no court until the twentieth century had held thatjuries' determinations of punitive damages could be reviewed de novo was because,
until the twentieth century, the function served by punitive damages
was frequently compensatory, not retributive. 9 3 As a historical matter,
the Court was wrong about whether early courts viewed punitive damages as a form of punishment. 94 The point, however, is that the Court
took for granted that punishment requires a special sort of legal reasoning (moral) that places special constraints on what the state can
do, and how it does it.
IV.

WHAT PRocEss Is DuE FOR ExTRACOMPENSATORY DAMAGES?

The characterization of the function of twentieth-century punitive damages by the Court in Cooper and extracompensatory damages
by Judge Calabresi in Ciraolo are different, but they may share a common foundation. The Court felt that punishment, separate from the
compensation of the plaintiff, requires normative judgment and thus
is not merely a matter of measuring lost wealth or even pain and suffering. 95 Judge Calabresi did not explain his reasons for distinguishing extracompensatory damages that punish from socially
compensatory damages in the same terms as the Court. His argument, if it can be traced back to the distinction between general and
specific deterrence, must be based on the way that actors are incentivized under the two systems. Under specific deterrence, acts are prohibited or limited. 96 In other words, even in its mildest form, specific
deterrence ultimately works by restricting liberty, not by shifting the
costs of an activity.
92. Id. at 434-35 (citing United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321 (1998) ($357,144
forfeiture excessive for a reporting violation); Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1983) (life
imprisonment excessive for nonviolent felony); Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982)
(death penalty excessive for robbery leading to murder); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584
( 1977) ( death penalty excessive for rape)).
93. Id. at 437 n .11 .
94. I discuss the historical functions of punitive damages in another article. See Sebok,
supra note 14, at 195-204.
95. Cooper, 532 U.S. at 437-38 & n.11.
96. THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS, supra note 33, at 95-96.
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The rationale for imposing penalties according to specific deterrence may not be the same as the rationale for imposing punishment
under the Court's theory in Cooper. Penalties are imposed under specific deterrence to prevent certain acts either by the actor or other
future actors. In that sense, the penalty is clearly not based on the
cost of the activity as between the actor and his or her victim, but on
some other measure. The punishments that the Court may have had
in mind in Cooper could have been based on an entirely different, retributive measure. But what the two systems of penalties have in common is that neither the ground for the imposition of damages, nor the
quantum of damages for which the defendant is responsible, are conditioned on the cost of the interaction between the actor and his or
her victims. The ground is instead the failure of the actor to have
conformed his or her conduct in a certain way, and the quantum of
damages is based on some independent scale, either of reprehensibility (in the case of Cooper) or of total social injury (in the case of
Ciraolo).
So the question posed by Ciraolo can be reframed as follows: If
socially compensatory damages are penalties within the logic of specific deterrence, are they consistent with due process? According to
the Court, the answer is probably "no," although it is not as easy to
discern the Court's true views given the murky arguments it has provided until now.
The clearest statement by the Court on this question comes out
of State Farm Mutual Automobi/,e Insurance Co. v. Campbell. 9 7 The case
involved a suit by an insured against his insurer for failure to settle in
good faith a claim arising from a fatal car accident. 98 The jury
awarded Campbell $2.6 million for emotional distress suffered as a
result of the bad faith and $145 million in punitive damages.99 Both
awards were reduced by the trialjudge. 100 The Utah Supreme Court
then reinstated the punitive damages award on the grounds that the
jury's assessment of punitive damages was justified under Gore.10 1
Justice Kennedy, writing for a six-member majority, conceded
that the trial record could support the claim that State Farm's treatment of Campbell merited punitive damages. 102 Justice Kennedy was
quite critical of the decision by the lower courts to take into account
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.

538 U.S. 408 (2003).
Id. at 412-14.
Id. at 41 5.
Id.
Id. at 415-16.
Id. at 419.
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what he called "conduct that bore no relation to Campbells' harm." 103
Evidence of this conduct, which included evidence of out-of-state activities that, if true, harmed the interests of a wide range of State
Farm's customers and other third parties around the country, was introduced to satisfy the "reprehensibility" prong of the Gore test. 104 Justice Kennedy noted that this conduct was not identical to the conduct
that harmed Campbell. 105 He argued that "[d]ue process does not
permit courts, in the calculation of punitive damages, to adjudicate
the merits of other parties' hypothetical claims against a defendant
under the guise of the reprehensibility analysis." 106
The problem with Justice Kennedy's argument, as he was well
aware, is that Gore did allow courts determining punitive damage to
take into account duplicative wrongful behavior that harmed nonplaintiff parties. 107 Justice Kennedy could hide behind the fact that
the conduct attributed to State Farm by Campbell at trial was not literally duplicative. 108 The ambiguity in Justice Kennedy's statement
above, however, is that it is not clear whether due process forbids the
consideration of hypothetical claims by nonpresent victims against the
defendant (which would exclude even duplicative acts of wrongdoing), or the consideration of unrelated claims (which could, in theory,
permit hypothetical but identical claims). 109 IfJustice Kennedy's position is the latter, then Judge Calabresi's socially compensatory damages would not be barred by the Due Process Clause, despite the fact
that they are a type of penalty designed to promote specific deterrence. If Justice Kennedy's position is the former, and the Court's
current position on due process and punitive damages is right, then it
seems that the only way that Judge Calabresi could justify socially com103. Id. at 422-23.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 423-24. The conduct concerning other parties differed because some of it
involved first-party, not third-party, insurance, and most of it did not involve car insurance.
106. Id. at 423.
107. See BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 576-77 (1996) . In fact, the final
punitive damages award resulting from the rehearing of the Gore suit by the Alabama
courts awarded the plaintiff $50,000. BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 701 So. 2d 507, 515
(Ala. 1997). This is 12.5 times the plaintiff's economic damages ($4,000), and close to the
cost of the plaintiff's economic damages multiplied by the number of cars with the same
defect as the plaintiff's that BMW sold in Alabama (14 x $4,000=$56,000).
108. Campbell, 538 U.S. at 423-24 ("[B]ecause the Campbells have shown no conduct by
State Farm similar to that which harmed them, the conduct that harmed them is the only
conduct relevant to the reprehensibility analysis.") . The Campbells had alleged that State
Farm had refused to settle in good faith a claim brought under their automobile liability
policy, but had introduced evidence that State Farm had engaged in a nationwide scheme
to reduce costs in all types of consumer insurance. Id. at 420-22.
109. See Sharkey, supra note 31, at 361-62.
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pensatory damages would be to place them within the category of
compensation.
Gore does not provide much of an answer. Justice Stevens analyzed past conduct as an indicator of the defendant's "disrespect for
the law," and disrespect for the law was taken to be a measure of the
reprehensibility of the defendant's act, one of the three Gore factors.110 Justice Stevens noted that disrespect for the law is only one
among a number of factors that informs reprehensibility. 111 The nature of the injury caused by the defendant was of primary importance-whether, for example, the defendant's act caused personal
injury or some other harm, such as financial injury or destruction of
property. In Gore, for example, one of the most important considerations mitigating against high punitive damages was that the defendant's act of concealment caused only minor economic harm. 112

Gore did say, however, that "disrespect for the law" is one element
of reprehensibility. 113 The reason for this is obvious: If punitive damages serve a deterrent function, it would make sense to sanction those
who knowingly flout the law, regardless of the consequences that flow
from their choices. Even the most rational wrongdoer cannot be certain of the particular results of their wrongdoing. Minor offenses
from an ex ante perspective may result, ex post, in unexpectedly large
social losses. Furthermore, there may be spillover effects from minor
wrongdoing. Respect for law among others may be weakened, and
the wrongdoer herself may be emboldened to pursue further, larger
wrongs. From a retributive point of view, the argument for punishing
wrongdoing regardless of consequences is more direct. A knowing
violation of society's rules is an act of disrespect towards the victim
and towards society. The victim has a direct interest in retribution,
either because he has suffered a palpable psychic or hedonic loss, or
because of a moral injury for which damages for pain and suffering
cannot account. 114 Some might argue that the state itself may have an
interest in retribution for the violation of its rules, regardless of conse-

llO. Gare, 517 U.S. at 576-77.
ll l. Id. at 575-77. The Court defined the term "degree of reprehensibility" variously as
"enormity of [the] offense" (quoting Day v. Woodworth, 54 U.S. 363, 371 (1852)) and
"[t]he flagrancy of the misconduct" (quoting David G. Owen, A Punitive Damages Overview:
Functions, Problems and Refrmn, 39 VILL. L. REv. 363,387 (1994)) . Gare, 517 U.S. at 575 &
n.23.
'
112. Gare, 517 U.S. at 576.
113. Id. at 577.
114. E.g., Galanter & Luban, supra note 31 ; at 1432-40;Jean Hampton, Currecting Harms
Versus Righting Wrongs-: The Goal of Retribution, 39 UCl.A L. REv. 1659, 1685-86 (1992).
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quence, simply because the state as an entity has an interest in
respect. 115
Disrespect for the law can be evidenced by the defendant's conduct as it relates to the act causing the injury. It can also be evidenced
by conduct before the act. As Justice Stevens noted in Gore,
"[c]ertainly, evidence that a defendant has repeatedly engaged in prohibited conduct while knowing or suspecting that it was unlawful
would provide relevant support for an argument that strong medicine
is required to cure the defendant's disrespect for the law."ll 6 But
what past acts should count as evidence of the defendant's attitude
when they committed the act that injured the plaintiff? Justice Stevens expanded on his claim that evidence of past knowledge of wrongdoing was relevant to ascertaining "disrespect" by noting that "[o]ur
holdings that a recidivist may be punished more severely than a first
offender recognize that repeated misconduct is ·more reprehensible
than an individual instance of malfeasance." 117 Justice Stevens illustrated this point by citing Gryger v. Burke, 118 a 1948 case that upheld a
Pennsylvania sentencing law similar to the "three strikes and you're
out" laws passed recently in a number of states.11 9 In Gryger, however,
there was no question that the defendant had been the subject of at
least four criminal proceedings. 12° Could Justice Stevens have really
meant that, in order to measure the disrespect exhibited by BMW towards the people of Alabama, Gore had to show that BMW was literally a recidivist?
The Court seemed satisfied that the evidence presented by Gore
at trial established BMW's repeated disrespect for Alabama's fraud
law. 121 It is not clear whether it would have mattered, in establishing
that fact, whether there had been ten or fourteen or one hundred
BMW customers who had been harmed in the same way that Gore had
been harmed. By noting that fourteen other Alabamans had been the
target of BMW's wrongful act, 122 the Court could not have been claiming that fourteen other Alabamans were legally injured by BMW's act.
115. See, e.g., Jacque v. Steenberg Homes, Inc., 563 N.W.2d 154, 164-65 (Wis. 1997)
(finding that a $100,000 punitive damages award where the jury awarded $1 nominal damages was not excessive under Gore where the defendant "brazen[ly]" and "intentional[ly]"
trespassed on another's land, thus exhibiting "reckless disregard for the law") .
116. Gore, 517 U.S. at 576-77 (citing TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S.
443, 462 n.28 (1993)) .
117. Id. at 577.
118. 334 U.S. 728 (1948) .
119. Id. at 731.
120. Id. at 730.
121. Gore, 517 U.S. at 577-80.
122. Id. at 564.
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Too many hurdles, many of them highly technical, would have to be
cleared to know whether any one of those fourteen customers were
legally harmed and by how much. Some of the customers may have
allowed the statute of limitations to run on their claims, some may
have been estopped from raising their claims, and some may have
failed to mitigate any damages. These technical questions may not be
relevant from the perspective of judging the attitude of BMW when it
set out to defraud in Alabama, but they would be considered relevant
by a court charged with determining whether, as a matter of tort law,
any single victim suffered a legal harm. 123
One might say, therefore, that when Justice Stevens said that the
inquiry into a defendant's disrespect towards the law allows a court to
review evidence of past acts, he meant that the question should include past acts that illustrate attempted wrongs, regardless of whether
they resulted in legally cognizable injuries. If this is correct, then the
relationship between the attempted wrong (which is what the court
needs to ascertain) and the number of victims (and the depth of their
actual injuries) must be viewed in a new light. Justice Kennedy said
that Gore prevented courts from taking into account "other parties'
hypothetical claims." 124 An "attempted tort" is hypothetical, but in a
different way than the unproven legal injury of the fourteen other
Alabaman BMW customers is hypothetical. Their claims are hypothetical because the legal predicates upon which they are based simply
have not been established (although they might have been). An attempted tort is hypothetical as regards to the victims it could have
harmed (that is why, unlike in criminal law, there is no cause of action
for attempted tort). However, whether or not the defendant acted
with a certain attitude when he harmed the plaintiff is not hypothetical. That is a matter of fact that can be established by the factfinder at
trial. If we believe that this attitude should matter to the selection or
application of the penalty the plaintiff can impose on the defendant,

123. These potential plaintiffs might not have sued because they were unaware of their
injury. BMW's wrong may have created what Sharkey calls "diffuse harms": harms that are
too small for any single party to notice or were not noticed because the defendant actively
concealed his wrongdoing. Sharkey, supra note 31, at 400. On the other hand, these potential plaintiffs might not have had a right to damages even had they sued. As Galligan
has noted, "there are legal doctrines that serve normative goals consistent with an individual model of tort law, but that lead to significantly less-than-optimal deterrence." Galligan,
Deterrence and Punishment, supra note 42, at 139.
·
124. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 423 (2003).
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then the plaintiff's invocation of past similar acts does not involve a
hypothetical claim. 125
This way of understanding the role of past acts in order to determine reprehensibility limits the sort of evidence that might be acceptable. Only evidence that is probative of the attitude of the defendant
when engaged in the act that harmed the plaintiff should be considered permissible under the Due Process Clause. More importantly,
the actual consequences of a past similar act are in themselves irrelevant, except to the ·extent that they inform the fact.finder about the
defendant's attitude when they did the act that harmed the
plain tiff. 126

125. Of course, one might take the position that penalties should never be imposed by
private litigants. See, e.g., Martin H. Redish & Andrew L. Mathews, Why Punitive Damages Are
Unconstitutiona~ 53 EMORY LJ. 1 (2004). Redish and Mathews' argument is based on both a
specific reading of the political theory they believe sits behind the Constitution, and a
historical account of punitive damages identical to that offered by the Supreme Court in
Cooper, which postulates a change in the function of punitive damages from personal compensation to retribution. Id. at 13-19. Al; they note, there has been in American law a
tradition of civil penalties parallel to the tradition of punitive damages; those penalties
have always functioned to provide both retribution and deterrence, yet do not trigger the
protections that would normally accompany a criminal sanction. Id. at 20. Redish and
Mathews suggest that the category of civil fines is itself constitutionally suspect, but that in
any case the distinctive feature of modern punitive damages-that they permit private litigants to take over the role of the state in pursuing civil penalties-make them constitutionally suspect. Id. at 19-21.
126. See Campbell, 538 U.S. at 422-23; Gore, 517 U.S. at 575-77. Unfortunately, the Supreme Court's instructions to the lower courts about how to handle evidence about reprehensibility has consisted mostly in discussing what not to include. For example: "The
reprehensibility guidepost does not permit courts to expand the scope of the case so that a
defendant may be punished for any malfeasance, which in this case extended for a 20-year
period." Campbell, 538 U.S. at 424.
Thomas Colby has offered a few useful suggestions in his excellent critique of "total
harm" punitive damages (which are quite similar to socially compensatory damages):
The jury can consider evidence of additional wrongdoing as a means of providing
some context for the harm at issue, so as to determine whether the individual
wrong to the victim is more reprehensible when considered in light of the defendant's entire course of conduct. It may not, however, punish the additional
harm .. ..
Nor should the jury attempt to take away the profits that accrued to the defendant as the result of wrongs not at issue ....
. . . It [should] not ask how many other wrongs the defendant committed, and it
[should] not concern itself•with whether or not the defendant will, in fact, escape
liability for other wrongs.
Thomas B. Colby, Beyond the Multiple Punishment Problem: Punitive Damages as Punishment for
Individual, Private Wrongs, 87 MINN. L. REv. 583, 666-69 (2003).
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WHAT Now FOR SocIALLY COMPENSATORY DAMAGES?

The hard question raised by Judge Calabresi in Ciraolo should not
be avoided simply because the Supreme Court has created an almost
"impenetrable barrier to punitive damages" in Newport. 127 As a number of critics have pointed out, the Court's reasons for creating a special test for municipalities is hard to justify, except on the ground that
municipalities are financially vulnerable. 128 There are at least two reasons for allowing punitive damages against municipalities. First, like
corporations ap.d other organizations, municipalities are likely to respond to penalties since the leaders of an organization must ultimately answer to its members for the expenses incurred in its name.
Therefore, the goal of deterrence, which is one function of punishment, could be served by a punitive damage award. 129 A second function, which has not been discussed in this Article, is that punitive
damages paid by a municipality to a victim of an intentional or reckless violation of rights could serve as a form of "satisfaction" for the
victim. Redress obtained in this way is not monetary payment for
emotional distress, which is what the Cooper Court mistakenly assumed
punitive damages once provided. 130 It is instead a form of personal
retribution that, unlike private revenge, is carefully controlled (and
facilitated) by the state. 131 There are different theories of what retribution in private law might mean, and for purposes of this Article
there is no need to choose among them. 132 What is important is that
127. Webster v. City of Houston, 689 F.2d 1220, 1231 (5th Cir. 1982) (Goldberg, J.,
specially concurring) , rev'd on other grounds, 735 F.2d 838 (5th Cir. 1984) (en bane).
128. Myriam E. Gilles, In Defense of Making Government Pay: The Deterrent Effect of Constitutional Tort Remedies, 35 GA. L. REv. 845, 871-73 (2001); Michael Wells, Punitive Damages for
Constitutional Torts, 56 LA. L. REv. 841 , 866 (1996) ; Gloria Jean Rottell, Note, Paying The
Price: It's Time To Hold Municipalities Liabl,e for Punitive Damages Under 42 U.S. C. § 1983, 10
j.L. & PoL'Y 189, 203 (2001) .
129. See Gilles, supra note 128, at 873.
130. See Cooper Indus. v. Leatherman Tool Group, 532 U.S. 424, 437 n .11 (2001) .
131. See Galanter & Luban, supra note 31 , at 1432-33 (citing Jean Hampton, The Retributive Idea, in FORGIVENESS AND MERCY 111 (Jean Hampton & Jeffrie G. Murphy eds., 1988)).
Whether or not retribution is an appropriate goal in criminal punishment is really a twopart question: first, whether retribution is ever an appropriate goal for the law to pursue,
and second, if it is, whether it is an appropriate goal for the state to pursue. One need not
take a position on the latter question in order to endorse a retributive function for punitive
damages.
132. Galanter and Luban adopt a view that retribution in private law is a form of moral
rebalancing. See id. Hampton argued that retribution involves correcting a false claim,
made by the defendant through his or her action, about the moral value of the plaintiff,
and that it is this "moral injury" that has to be annulled. Hampton, supra note 114, at 1679.
The German conception of "satisfaction damages" ( Genugtuung) has its roots in the nineteenth-century idea that there can be injuries to honor, which are quite different from
emotional distress or pain (Schmerzensgeul). See Volker Behr, Punitive Damages in American
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the justification for private retribution is no different when the author
of a victim's injury is the state, and not a private individual or a
corporation.
Judge Calabresi bemoaned that, because of Newport, punitive
damages could not be awarded to Debra Ciraolo. 133 But what if they
could have been awarded? Had the Supreme Court allowed the City
of New York to be treated like Ford Motor Company, this Article has
shown that the jury's award to Ciraolo would have been a penalty, not
compensation, and thus would have been subject to the due process
constraints articulated in Gore and later in Campbell The jury that decided Ciraolo's suit awarded her a $5 million punitive damages award
in addition to her $19,645 award for emotional distress. 134 Once the
theory of socially compensatory damages is taken off the table, what
would happen to the $5 million award, were Newport overruled or
modified?
In Campbell,Justice Kennedy warned that "[s]ingle-digit multipliers are more likely to comport with due process" than ratios of ten or
higher. 135 He also admitted that, "because there are no rigid
benchmarks that a punitive damages award may not surpass, ratios
greater than those we have previously upheld may comport with due
process where 'a particularly egregious act has resulted in only a small
amount of economic damages.' " 136 Since Campbell, state and federal
courts have been reviewing punitive damages awards and, guided by
Justice Kennedy's words, have been reducing awards that stand at ratios higher than ten to one. 137
It is ironic that the Supreme Court's chief contribution to the
debate over how to bring punitive damages into conformity with due
process has been the imposition of a draconian ratio. The actual ratio
and German Law-Tendencies Tawards Af>frroximation of Apparently Irreconcilable Concepts, 78
Cm.-KENT. L. REv. 105, 127-36 (2003). There are nuanced differences between these views,
which deserve to be treated in another article. See Anthony J. Sebok, Legal Culture and the
Desire for Retribution: Punishment in German and Anierican Private Law (2002) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) .
133. See Ciraolo v. City of New York, 216 F.3d 236, 238 (2d Cir. 2000).
134. Id. at 237.
135. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 425 (2003).
136. Id. (quoting BMW ofN. Ani., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559,582 (1996)).
137. For a discussion of some of those cases, see Erwin Chemerinsky & Ned Miltenberg,
The Need to Clarify the Meaning of U.S. Supreme Court Remands: The Lessons of Punitive Damages '
Cases, 36 AR1z. ST. LJ. 513 (2004). One California Court of Appeals case analyzed by
Chemerinsky and Miltenberg is Romo v. Ford Motor Co., in which the same three:iudge panel
that had previously upheld the jury's $290 million punitive damages award reduced the
award on remand to $23.7 million. 6 Cal. Rptr. 3d 793 (Ct. App. 2003). The panel assumed that Campbell required that punitive damages could not be more than nine times
the actual damages. Id. at 803; Chemerinsky & Miltenberg, supra, at 525.
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it chose is less important than the decision to link the concept of a
ratio to the process of measuring the fairness of a penalty. The choice
is ironic because the escape route adopted by Judge Calabresi, which
was supposed to provide a foundation for extracompensatory damages
that did not run afoul of due process, is also a ratio. For Judge Calabresi, if a punitive damages award equaled the injury suffered by the
plaintiff multiplied by the number of plaintiffs not able to sue, the
resulting amount was not a penalty, but fair social compensation.
VI.

CONCLUSION

This Article has argued that the ratios recommended by the theory of socially compensatory damages must be subjected to the same
due process scrutiny as any private penalty. There is no reason to believe, however, that a retreat into the ratio recommended by Campbell
will provide guidance worthy of due process. A number of courts have
already found various methods to avoid the upper limit of the singledigit ratio set up by the Supreme Court. 138 Furthermore, just because
the correct measure of the size of the penalty Debra Ciraolo could
impose on the City of New York was not the sum of all the injuries
138. See Mathias v. Accor Econ. Lodging, Inc., 347 F.3d 672, 676, 678 (7th Cir. 2003)
(justifying a 37:1 ratio between a $186,000 punitive award and a $5,000 compensatory
award based on potential victims who were never compensated by the defendant); In re
Exxon Valdez, 296 F. Supp. 2d 1071 , 1099-1110 (D. Alaska 2004) (finding a $5 billion
punitive damages award not excessive if compared against $513 million in monies paid by
the defendant to settle other parties' suits rather than the $20 million in compensatory
damages awarded by the court in the lawsuit); Dunn v. Village of Put-In-Bay, Ohio, No.
3:02CV7252, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 882, at *l , *Mi (N.D. Ohio Jan. 26, 2004) (deciding
that, despite a 15:1 ratio, the $23,422.50 punitive award was not excessive because the
$1,577.50 compensatory award was "nominal" in nature); Willow Inn, Inc. v. Pub. Serv.
Mut. Ins. Co., No. 00-5481, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9558, at *2-3, *8 (E.D. Pa.July 21, 2003)
(upholding a $150,000 punitive damages award where the court awarded $2,000 in compensatory damages because the potential harm to the plaintiff was $150,000, and that ratio
would be 1:1); Myers v. Workmen's Auto Ins. Co., 95 P.3d 977, 982-83, 991-92 (Idaho 2004)
(upholding a $300,000 punitive damages award because a $2,171.85 compensatory award
was "nominal"); Phelps v. Louisville Water Co., 103 S.W.3d 46, 54-55 (Ky. 2003) (upholding
a ratio that was more than 11 :1 due to the low amount of compensatory damages that
could not adequately punish and deter the defendant's conduct) ; Madeja v. MPB Corp.,
821 A.2d 1034, 1050-51 (N.H. 2003) (upholding a 35:1 ratio in a sexual harassment case
and noting that the measurement of compensatory to punitive damages is not limited to an
exact mathematical calculation); Williams v. Philip Morris, Inc., 92 P.3d 126, 144-46 (Or.
2004) (finding that a $79 million punitive award, which resulted in an approximate 96:1
ratio, was actually closer to 4:1 ratio given the hypothetical damages caused to nonplaintiffs, and was not excessive) ; Hollock v. Erie Ins. Exch., 842 A.2d 409, 421-22 (Pa. Super. Ct.
2004) (imposing a 10:1 ratio was close to the Campbell limit and did not violate due process); Trinity Evangelical Lutheran Church v. T9wer Ins. Co., 661 N.W.2d 789, 794, 803-04
(Wis. 2003) (upholding a punitive damages award of $3.5 million in a bad faith case because the defendant-insurer exposed the plaintiff to $490,000 in potential liability) .
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hypothetically caused by its wrongdoing, there is no reason to believe
that the correct measure of the penalty was necessarily less than
$196,450 (ten times the amount of compensatory damages awarded).
The jury thought the right amount was $5 million, approximately two
hundred fifty times the compensatory damages awarded. In this Article, I take no position on whether a $5 million punitive damages
award would have been excessive, from the perspective of due process,
or inappropriate, given the various functions of punitive damages. All
I argue in this Article is that the right way to measure the scale of the
punitive damages award-whether from the perspective of determining whether the amount exceeded the limits of constitutional permissibility or whether the amount was properly scaled to fit the purpose
of the award-is not going to be found in any method that focuses the
court's inquiry on hypothetical losses caused by the defendant to hypothetical plaintiffs. 139
139. Mathias illustrates the practical difficulties of asking questions about hypothetical
damages. The plaintiffs had been bitten by bedbugs in the defendant's hotel. Mathias, 347
F.3d at 673. At trial, the plaintiffs offered evidence that the defendant, in an attempt to
save money, refused to have the hotel's bedbug infestation cured. Id. at 674-75. The court
awarded $5,000 in compensatory damages, as well as $186,000 in punitive damages. Id. at
674. Judge Richard Posner upheld the award in spite of Campbell's "single-digit" ratio test,
with the following argument:
[Plaintiffs] were given Room 504, even though the motel had classified the room
as "DO NOT RENT UNTIL TREATED," and it had not been treated. Indeed,
that night 190 of the hotel's 191 rooms were occupied, even though a number of
them had been placed on the same don't-rent status as Room 504. One of the
defendant's motions in limine that the judge denied was to exclude evidence
concerning all other rooms-a good example of the frivolous character of the
motions and of the defendant's pertinacious defense of them on appeal.
All things considered, we cannot say that the award of punitive damages was excessive, albeit the precise number chosen by the jury was arbitrary. It is probably
not a coincidence that $5,000 + $186,000 = $191,000/ 191 = $1 ,000: i.e., $1,000
per room in the hotel.
Id. at 675, 678. If a court were to uphold the award on the basis of a "hypothetical damages" argument, would it not be incumbent on the plaintiff to discover how many of the
customers who occupied the other 189 rooms suffered an injury? If that task was impossible, then was it not incumbent on the plaintiff to develop a scientific estimate of the sum of
the wrongs that were hypothetically caused by the defendant? Naturally, one question that
one might ask, if the plaintiff attempted such an understanding, is how a technique designed to answer the question of hypothetical harm caused by hypothetical wrongs is different from a class action. See Sharkey, supra note 31, at 404 (arguing that punitive damages
representing "societal damages" may be a "poor man's class action").
Some of these questions parallel questions raised above in the discussion of the attempted torts discussed in Gore. See supra text accompanying note 123. For example, while
it may seem obvious that anyone who had been bitten by bedbugs in the defendant's hotel
suffered an injury at the hands of the defendant, this conclusion assumes that each of the
hypothetical victims, if they had brought a suit, would have had a valid claim, identical in
every way to the actual plaintiff who brought the suit. While it is hard to know how the
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What is missing from the contemporary debate over pumt1ve
damages is a recognition that the right answer to the question "How
large should punitive damages be?" is not going to come from a ratio
or any other pseudo-objective test. This admonition may not comfort
those who believe that the greatest problem with punitive damages is
their absolute size, and who therefore welcomed Campbell for no other
reason than that it was a Procrustean solution that cut off high
awards. 140 But we have a deeper problem in punitive damages jurisprudence-one of a failure of theory. In the absence of a serious,
normative theory about the purpose of punitive damages within their
own terms-e.g., as a unique form of private penalization-advocates
from all sides of the debate have little or nothing else to recommend
to juries other than ratios. In Romo v. Ford Motor Co., for example, the
attorneys for the plaintiffs successfully persuaded the jury that the defendant, Ford, had engaged in an act so reprehensible that it was the
functional equivalent of manslaughter. 141 And yet, when it came time
to argue to the jury over the size of the penalty that the Romo family
should impose on Ford, the lawyers did not ask the jury to focus on
the relationship between the penalty and the wrong done to the
Romos. The lawyers instead reverted to a ratio: they argued that "$1
billion was the appropriate award, based on the profit Ford made on
all 1978-1979 Broncos, factored to reflect Ford's use of that money
over the next 20 years." 142

usual defenses might have affected the hypothetical plaintiffs whom, according to Judge
Posner, the jury might have been considering when they arrived at a $1,000 per room
penalty, it seems a little unreal that the plaintiffs, if they really existed, would all have had
valid cases.
140. For example, the American Tort Reform Association declared that, in the wake of
Campbell, "the plaintiffs' lawyers' golden goose for punitive damages is now dead." Press
Release, American Tort Reform Association, U.S. Supreme Court Action Confirms: Last
Month's Opinion on Punitive Damages Applies to Product Liability Cases (May 19, 2003),
availab/,e at www.atra.org/show/7561. It is not clear that, in fact, restricting punitive damages to ratios below 10:1 would have a significant effect on either the total number of
punitive damages awards or the total dollars awarded to plaintiffs in punitive damages
awards. Research suggests that punitive damage awards are very rarely awarded in ratios
higher than ten. Theodore Eisenberg et al., juries, judges, and Punitive Damages: An Empirical Study, 87 CORNELL L. REv. 743, 755-57 & tbl.2 (2002); see als~ THOMAS H. CoHEN &
STEVEN K. SMITH, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CIVIL TRIAL CAsES
AND VERDICTS IN LARGE CouNTRIES, 2001, at 7 (Bureau of Justice Statistics Bulletin No. NCJ
202803, 2004) (stating that only 14% of all punitive damages in tort cases were awarded at
ratios of four times compensatory damages or higher), available at http:/ /
www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/ ctcvlcOl.pdf.
141. 122 Cal. Rptr. 2d 139, 164 (Ct. App. 2002). Whether Ford's design defect and the
decisions leading to the death of the plaintiff deserved this characterization is not relevant.
142. Romo v. Ford Motor Co., 6 Cal. Rptr. 3d 793, 805 (Ct. App. 2003).
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There may be an argument that would allow a jury to equate the
Romos' desire to impose a penalty against Ford for what was done to
them with the penalty their lawyer asked for-which was the forfeiture
of the gains that Ford acquired by acting wrongfully towards a hypothetical class of victims-but that argument has not yet been developed, and the argument from ratio instead seems to be the plaintiffs'
bar's default choice. We should therefore not be surprised that, when
it came time to respond to the plaintiffs' bar's aggressive use of ratios,
the Supreme Court responded with a ratio of its own. This Article has
not taken on the task of demonstrating why rigid ratio-based limits on
punitive damages are inconsistent with the history and goals of punitive damages in the American tort system. A full critique of the ratiobased solution to the societal damages argument pressed by the plaintiffs in Campbell would properly be part of a larger project that offered
an alternative model for the determination of punitive damages in
common-law courts. I would like to conclude this Article by noting
that the approach dominating the current state of debate about punitive damages-whether for the purposes of instructing juries, persuading appellate courts, or debating tort reform-seems to resemble a
version of Gresham's Law, where bad arguments about punitive damages-those seeking to anchor them in a ratio-appear to drive out
the possibility of good arguments-those based on deeply felt principles of justice. 143

143. As a result, the current system of punitive damages remains highly unpredictable.
As Kahneman, Schkade, and Sunstein have noted, the participants in the experiments they
conducted with mock juries displayed "a remarkably high level of moral agreement" even
as they produced "highly erratic" and ~arbitrar[y]" punitive damage awards. Daniel
Kahneman et al., Shared Outrage, Erratic Awards, in PuNITNE DAMAGES: How JURIES DECIDE
31, 31 (Cass R. Sunstein et al. eds., 2002).

